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elf-Care as a Burdened Virtue  
In this paper, I complicate the moral lives of patients, 
specifically the mentally ill, and the moral burdens they 
face when addressing one’s self-care in managing 
chronic mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disor-
der. Much attention has been paid to the moral aspects of the doc-
tor-patient relationship, and the moral responsibilities of doctors. 
Bioethics, though, often limits its discussion of the moral respon-
sibilities of patients. I will articulate how self-care is an oppor-
tunity for patients to take control over their morality. 
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that self-care is a 
burdened virtue among the mentally ill. In this paper, self-care is 
defined as a combination of three factors: 1) self-awareness of 
current health status, 2) one’s place in the world, and 3) ability to 
take action to promote one’s wellbeing through this awareness. 
Additionally, I will argue for my points above using a conception 
of the mentally ill as an oppressed group; for the sake of brevity, I 
am going to assume this conception of the mentally ill, rather than 
argue that it is true.   
 As I understand the mentally ill as an oppressed group, I 
utilize Tessman’s work (Burdened Virtues) where she defined 
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“burdened virtues” as those traits that help one obtain human 
flourishing, but also detract and negatively impact the well-being 
of one’s self, which inevitably lead to the chance of great pain 
and suffering in the individual.I A burdened virtue both contrib-
utes to and inhibits human flourishing, especially for members of 
oppressed groups.  
Self-care is both enduring unchangeable factors associated 
with the diagnosis and having the courage and fortitude to re-
spond, along with an attempt to flourish under these factors. Men-
tally ill individuals experience well-documented hardships related 
to their treatment. They also have deficiencies in self-awareness 
in times of grave danger. Self-care provides mentally ill patients 
the ability to act in their best interests at all times, but specifically 
during times of instability. Self-care for a mentally ill patient is 
not the same as a mentally healthy patient taking responsibility 
for her health or acceptance of the sick role; the addition of self-
care complements patient responsibility.  
To help discern why self-care is a virtue, and specifically 
a burdened one, I will use the narrative of a schizophrenic patient 
from a popular book, The Quiet Room by author and fellow pa-
tient advocate, Lori Schiller. I will explore the following three 
questions: What is the nature of the virtue of self-care? What 
would it look like to practice self-care? Why is the virtue of self-
care needed in the mentally ill population? Finally, I will com-
pare self-care in two different populations, women who experi-
ence oppression and the mentally ill. In doing so, I will point to 
the differences between the two, and also begin to explain why 
self-care is a burdened virtue in the mentally ill, but one for op-
pressed women. 
 
What is a Virtue? 
As Aristotle defines it, virtue is the development of good 
moral character. Such character is created, transformed, and re-
fined by good or virtuous actions. Virtuous actions are seen to be 
the comfortable middle between the opposing vices of excess and 
deficiency.II Alasdair MacIntyre, in his modern approach to Aris-
totelian virtue, distinguishes internal versus external goods, 




Internal goods are those that are gathered by the participation in 
the practice whereas, external goods are just happenstance and 
occur through random chance of the situation. In that, internal 
goods can be considered goods of “excellence” and external 
goods to be goods of “effectiveness”. To clearly understand what 
virtues are and what they mean, it is imperative that a virtue is 
displayed through a range of practices, with both internal and ex-
ternal goods. In addition, through those practices, critical assess-
ments and other measures must be taken within the actual prac-
tice itself so as to ensure the virtue applies properly and an in-
tended social purpose is met. For example, wastefulness is exces-
sive spending of money and stinginess is the opposite; generosity 
lies in the middle. Generosity is the center between giving just 
enough while not inflicting self-harm via martyrdom by giving 
everything away.IV 
A virtue is defined by MacIntyre as an “acquired human qual-
ity where the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us 
to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the 
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods.”V MacIntyre’s beliefs can be summarized as a mechanism 
where virtue results from both action and character in a cyclic 
relationship where deliberation and rationality are central. This 
virtue mechanism is required for maintaining a specific social 
role and for excelling in a specific area of practice under that 
role. By definition, practice is “any coherent and complex form 
of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course 
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are ap-
propriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with 
the results that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended.”VI Therefore, virtues do not exist only out of actions 
but as some culmination of actions, practice, and character. It is 
important to note that both good character and good activities are 
dependent on social, historical, and cultural contexts.  
Inevitably, any trouble in this mechanism can result in out-
comes such as poor cultivation of virtue, issues related to charac-
ter, and the resulting actions of the individual. Furthermore, we 
must note the difference between internal and external goods in 
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relation to practice. As previously described, a practice is a com-
plex, cooperative social activity where excellence can be 
achieved through understanding of the goods involved in the ac-
tivity. In continuation, external goods, are related to a competi-
tion where there are winners and losers. However, these are just 
objects that seem beneficial but do not improve one’s virtue. In 
contrast, internal goods are based on the outcome of the competi-
tion and the benefit of the achievement to the entire community. 
Two key points are crucial to remember: first, the acquisition of 
virtues is a means to an end. Second, that relationship is one of 
internal, rather than external, goods.  
 
The Nature of Self-Care as a Virtue 
To understand how a virtuous patient should engage mod-
ern psychiatry, one must notice that the practice of medicine is 
dependent on social and historical forces. Thus, the patient suffer-
ing from mental illness cannot be separated from the social and 
historical forces that created both the conception of mental ill-
ness, nor from the related forces that created the mentally healthy 
patient. Patients enacting self-care are working through the prac-
tice of medicine via the patient-provider relationship. In schizo-
phrenia, patients often go through waves of their disorder, includ-
ing the active phase known as the hallucinations, delusions, and 
disturbance in their thoughts and feelings; while they also can go 
through periods of passive, less symptomatic schizophrenia.  
Often, the mentally ill patient is thought to have failed or 
is deemed incapable of being responsible for herself, in attending 
to her physical, mental, and moral well-being. As an example, 
consider the work of Lori Schiller, a psychiatric patient chal-
lenged with the burden of her illness and the challenges that fol-
low. An excerpt from an interview with Lori Schiller states:  
People would say to me, 'Why do you want to kill your-
self? Are you depressed?' More than anything else I want-
ed relief. I couldn't listen anymore. I could see those faces 
on the walls laughing at me or telling me I had to die. VII 
 
Furthermore, her life still comes with a price. She is constantly 




cope with a variety of responses from individuals who attend her 
book signings or other public events. These responses can be par-
ticularly challenging when she encounters individuals who have 
misconceptions about schizophrenia or her experiences living 
with a mental illness.VIII Elsewhere, Schiller discusses how her 
suicidal ideations often kept her calm and centered because it fol-
lowed what the Voices wanted her to do. She begins by saying: 
“As frightening as these potential suicidal scenarios seem, they 
are all held for me a real ending of tranquility and eternal peace.” 
She precedes this by discussing how she received her diagnosis: 
 
Eventually, I entered the ‘revolving door’ into the so-
called mental health system. The doctors, so dapper and 
professional in their psychiatric style and attire, told my 
parents that I was a paranoid schizophrenic who had little 
chances of getting better. My diagnosis was just another 
‘sick chronic psychiatric patient’ to be shoved away for-
ever in some hospital. IX 
 
Moving forward, we should recognize that these scenarios are but 
two examples of what schizophrenia patients might cope with as 
part of their diagnosis. Through these examples, the virtue of self
-care will be explored.  
Here, it is helpful to clarify the nature of self-care, partic-
ularly in contrast to other standard virtues with which patients 
might engage. Above, I defined self-care as a combination of self
-awareness of current health status and place in the world, along 
with the ability to take action to promote one’s wellbeing through 
this awareness.  
Self-care is not “responsibility for self.” Responsibility is 
based on a person’s intentions, whether voluntary or involuntary. 
Moral responsibility is too much for the mentally ill. Further-
more, a person is responsible for their character because a person 
develops their character through their actions.X Responsibility is 
a process that occurs when acting as a normal agent. The mental-
ly ill are often unable to take complete legal or moral responsibil-
ity and are unable to act as a legal or moral agent. Thus, the vir-
tue of responsibility does not fit the need required by this group 
and is rather unattainable for them.  
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Due to this, self-care is a virtue that can be achieved by 
the mentally ill, versus responsibility for self, which requires 
agency that might not always be achieved in this population. Self-
care is more manageable for the mentally ill than responsibility; 
although it is weaker than the virtue of responsibility, it is still an 
important virtue. 
Furthermore, self-care is not reducible to “prudence.” Pru-
dence can be defined as a reluctance to take risks or over-
cautiousness; it also can be termed as rational choice or practical 
wisdom. Prudence is the ability to govern and discipline oneself 
by the use of reason. Likewise, it also incorporates a course of 
action that is related to perfection of ability. To explain, without 
prudence, virtue is practically impossible because a balance is 
unattainable. Self-care is a different virtue than prudence because 
prudence lends too much towards perfection and an absolute bal-
ance without being too cautious or too practical. Self-care is 
about self-awareness and the ability to act for an individual’s best 
interest, whether or not it is practiced in too practical or too cau-
tious a method.  
In The Rules of Insanity, Carl Elliott discusses the differences 
between ignorance and compulsion and how that relates to the 
responsibility of an individual. Ignorance is defined as a person 
not being aware of their actions, whereas compulsion is defined 
as a person not being able to help what he or she is doing. In a 
schizophrenic patient, often the individual lacks awareness of his 
or her actions, which means that he or she also is not in control of 
character because of the inability to rationalize and deliberate.  
In this mechanism, based on MacIntyre’s previously-defined 
theory of practice, it seems impossible for a mentally ill person to 
be virtuous. Prudence suggests that the person must perceive and 
understand the situation appropriately and further act on behalf of 
that perception. The perception and judgement required are al-
ready in question in responsibility, but in prudence, character is 
more than just the sum of actions. Mental illnesses, especially 
schizophrenia, stunt a person’s ability to advocate and determine 
what is best for one’s personal welfare. This negates any possible 
self-protectiveness, especially in regards to the virtue of pru-
dence.XI   
The mentally ill have no opportunity to achieve the flourish-
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ing associated with the virtues of responsibility and prudence. If 
living is about the ability to experience emotional connections, 
responsibility, flourishing, and other internal goods related to the 
virtue of self-care, then, the mentally ill do not have the oppor-
tunity to follow the definition of human flourishing with those 
virtues. This is because the patient is unable to practice the virtue 
of self-responsibility or prudence properly due to his or her ill-
ness. This does not mean these individuals are incapable of prac-
ticing self-care or other virtues; it means that the practice of self-
care and related virtues rely on the development of multiple so-
cial identities in an individual, and intermingle depending upon 
the current mental state. This kind of care-taking is beyond the 
scope of medical professionals or family members. Instead, it is 
about the individual and her understanding and perception of the 




The practice of self-care is challenging to achieve in prac-
tice, as is true with most of Aristotle’s virtues. As previously de-
scribed, self-care is defined as a combination of self-awareness of 
current health status and place in the world along with the ability 
to take action to promote one’s well-being through this aware-
ness. For example, self-care in the mentally ill could be patients 
taking the initiative to discuss medication side effects they are 
experiencing with their providers and, further, having an open 
conversation about what can be done in the future to prevent 
those side effects, whether through discontinuation of the medica-
tion (safely) or counseling services. In many cases, individuals 
may feel that they are betraying themselves by having those open 
conversations, in particular the case of schizophrenia, where voic-
es may be telling them to do otherwise.  
Honoring oneself is related to recognition and giving rea-
soning for choices and emotions.XII It is extremely difficult to 
maintain personal honor while also sacrificing oneself through 
the burdened virtue of self-care. To clarify: honoring oneself is 
completely separate from self-care, but I will use the nature and 
practice of honoring oneself to further understand the virtue of 
self-care. Self-care, in contrast, is not at all about recognition but 
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rather about self-respect and preservation of the self through al-
ternative and preventative methods such as plans for “bad” days 
for loved one to follow or additional friendships and connections 
to maintain the “good” mental health status rather than a spiral 
downwards. Self-care in psychiatric patients enables actions to 
take place even when they might not be able to honor themselves 
because a specific level of awareness and rationality is not being 
reached. Therefore, they must practice self-care, which entails 
putting responsibility and care in the hands of those trusted and 
respected to make decisions on behalf of the individual. This can 
further help to limit the damage that can ensue from their inabil-
ity to practice self-honor. Self-care also is about understanding 
the various levels of involvement required for proper psychiatric 
care. This includes therapists, doctors, family members, and so-
cial workers as part of the treatment regimen and allowing open 
communication networks between any and all of these people.   
Another important distinction of self-care is that self-care 
is a particular obligation that mentally ill patients owe them-
selves. The repetitive nature of chronic mental illness requires a 
significant amount of endurance. The virtue of self-care can help 
prevent further hospitalizations and better mental health out-
comes. Thus, interestingly, virtues-including self-carehave a great 
social benefit.  
Being mentally ill does not require the patient to be self-
sacrificing, but rather the illness creates difficulties for the indi-
vidual and health care professionals interacting with these indi-
viduals. If psychiatric patients choose not to practice self-care, 
they are cheating themselves out of the life they are guaranteed. 
In addition, self-care is about the realization of one’s own obliga-
tions to oneself and the recognition of the work one has to do so 
that others may help. A common question could be, does a se-
verely mentally ill patient, such as a schizophrenic, have autono-
my or rational decision-making skills?  This balancing act is hard 
enough in a healthy patient, but once a psychiatric patient is 
tasked with understanding various facets of human character and 
related actions, the challenge of virtuous actions can become 
overwhelming and further perpetuate a struggle for human excel-
lence in a psychiatric patient. Therefore, the actual virtue of self-
care eliminates some of the baggage associated with other virtues 
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(such as prudence and responsibility). Self-care is practiced when 
the patient is autonomous and able to make competent decisions 
whereas self-care is enacted when the patient is unable to act for 
one’s best interests. 
 
Self-Care as a Burdened Virtue: Differences in the Mentally 
Ill and Women 
 
 How is self-care enacted in other groups facing oppres-
sion, as women, different from its enactment by mentally ill pa-
tients? Oppression is the use of authority, law, or physical force, 
in an inequitable manner, to prevent others from being free and 
equal; a systematic mistreatment of a targeted group.XIII Identity 
is something that is unchosen, however, it also is about who we 
are as individuals in relation to everyone else.XIV Self-care among 
women is about taking action and claiming responsibility over 
their environments and identities in order to gain autonomy and 
independence as women. In contrast, self-care in the mentally ill 
is about understanding the different realms of mental stability and 
lucidness associated with the illness and developing skills to act 
properly in those different realms, especially in circumstances 
where self-sufficiency is not possible due to the lack of choice in 
mental illness.XV  
The practice of self-care is different for women and the men-
tally ill. A woman who is constantly undergoing inappropriate 
scrutiny by her male coworkers can go to her human resources 
department and report the coworkers; in this, she is taking action 
not only for her benefit but also for all women. Oppression, re-
member, works to cause harm to both the individual woman, and 
because of its systemic quality, women as a group or category. 
Alternatively, the act of reporting the event or whistleblowing 
could negatively impact her career by potentially leading to a de-
motion (or lack of promotion). Another example is standing up 
for women’s health and reproductive rights. Though this is fueled 
by political and religious controversy, the root of the situation is 
still about women’s health and the right she has over her own 
body. By addressing topics such as free contraceptives, women 
that actively discuss this with other women or the media, are act-
ing virtuously through self-care and maintaining their identity and 
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rights as women. However, women who bring attention to this 
issue in an unjust manner can cause strife and further violence or 
discrimination of women.  
For someone who has schizophrenia, developing an action 
plan for an alternate social identity can be self-care. Specifically, 
Lori Schiller knew she had schizophrenia and decided not to tell 
anyone for quite some time. This is going against self-care be-
cause she, as a mentally ill patient, has an obligation to practice 
self-care and to advocate for herself when she is able to do so. If 
not, she is inhibiting her ability to flourish as a human being be-
cause she is not pursuing a virtuous life. When she finally told 
someone, Schiller was able to release some autonomy, ensuring 
that when she was unable to take proper actions for herself, some-
one would be able to act in her best interest. This is a problem 
that often affects schizophrenics because they are unsure whether 
they have individual autonomy because the illness makes them 
feel otherwise.  
At the same time, by asking for help, Schiller was able to start 
connecting with others. This small step was part of a much bigger 
step in social support, which is self-care. She also could have 
practiced self-care by telling her family members and friends 
about her illness and symptoms sooner than she did. The educa-
tion and knowledge could have prevented one of her many sui-
cide attempts and also could have taught those close to her about 
schizophrenia so they could help to reduce the stigma and weight 
she had to bear. Each of these examples demonstrates a way that 
she could have developed a social identity capable of handling 
the worst of her schizophrenia while also developing another so-
cial identity that allows her to take part in advocating for both 
herself and other mentally ill people. But how does involving oth-
ers contribute to the virtue of self-care? Through the nature of self
-awareness and, therefore, the actions made to benefit oneself, 
reaching out to trusted individuals grants the mentally ill a specif-
ic level of autonomy in hard situations; that is the virtue of self-
care. 
With all of this, where is self-care? It is part of both action 
and character, but also connected to rationality and deliberation. 
Self-care is impossible for an individual to enact as a virtue, to 
help survive that oppression, without also negatively influencing 
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her own well-being, given that self-care is a burdened virtue. The 
most engaged struggle around the virtue of self-care is separating 
it from being self-regarding, and therefore not a virtue at all. As 
Tessman argues in Burdened Virtues, self-concern may not be 
considered morally virtuous because a virtue is supposed to be 
other-regarding rather than self. The difference between self-
concern and self-care is that, in self-care, the mentally ill patient 
is directly associated with providing evidence, support, and edu-
cation for others to then assist in taking care of said mentally ill 
person. If Lori Schiller had educated, say, her close friends about 
her wishes for when her schizophrenia went into an active stage, 
they would be able enact her best interests. This serves both the 
good of other’s well-being and her own. In acting with self-care, 
Schiller would have been self-aware of her current health status 
by educating her friends and then she would have taken action to 
promote her own well-being by developing a plan for when her 




In conclusion, self-care is combination of self-awareness of 
current health status and place in the world, along with, the abil-
ity to take action to promote one’s wellbeing through this aware-
ness. This is accomplished by the education, compassion, and 
caring which someone provides for the mentally ill individual. 
Self-care is more than just bodily care, and self-care is beyond 
responsibility or prudence. Self-care is a burdened virtue that acts 
in self-preservation for both the individual and the mentally 
healthy population.  Self-care is different than personal responsi-
bility for individual health. Self-care as a burdened virtue has two 
facets. First, self-care is the attempt to thrive despite oppressive 
factors associated with a diagnosis. Second, self-care allows men-
tally ill patients to develop the actions and enact those actions 
necessary to take responsibility and better their lives as well as 
other members of the group. 
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